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The Contextual Rationality of the Precautionary Principle
David Dana
Northwestern University School of Law
I.

Introduction

Is the precautionary principle (PP) incoherent and therefore irrational to use as a
guide or tool in policymaking? A number of thoughtful scholars have argued as much,
and their arguments, on their own terms, make a good deal of sense. These scholars,
however, are arguing about the PP in the abstract, asking whether it coheres as a matter of
abstract logic, and it may not – indeed it probably does not. But the PP does make sense
in particular, and very important, contexts. Rather than asking whether the PP is rational
in general, we should be asking whether or not there are contexts in which it is rational to
use the PP as a policy tool.

According to one much-cited formulation, the PP means that "[w]hen an activity
raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures
should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established
scientifically."1 Different versions of the PP build on the idea of "precautionary
measures,” and what this actually means or encompasses. In its strong forms, the PP
prescribes that an activity or product posing a risk to human health or the environment
should be flatly prohibited until it is scientifically proven that the activity or product, in
fact, will not harm human health or the environment. In its weak forms, the PP can take
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“Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle” (1998), online: <www.gdrc.org/u-gov/precaution3.html>.

the form of a mere cautious attitude, democratic inclusion, and/or additional efforts at
fact-finding, but no particular regulatory prohibitions or restrictions. In academic
discourse, the critics of PP tend to emphasize its strong forms, apparently because these
forms of PP lead to hard-to-defend results in certain cases. Conversely, academic
defenders of PP tend to emphasize its weaker forms, apparently because these forms of
PP can be squared with almost any decision and never lead to hard-to-defend results.2

This article defines the PP primarily based on what it is not: it is not quantitative
cost-benefit or cost-cost analysis of the sort we associate with the Office of Management
and Budget in the United States and U.S. policymaking and policy discourse generally.3
In this definition, the PP is a form of analysis in which the costs of a possible
environmental or health risk are not quantified, or if they are, any quantification is likely
to be inadequate to capture the full extent of the costs of not taking regulatory measures
to mitigate or avoid the risk. So defined, the PP is a more "rational" approach compared
to cost-benefit or cost-cost because, in certain contexts, the costs associated with an
environmental or health risk will tend to be relatively under-weighed without the
application of the PP to account for non-quantifiable risk.

After a brief discussion of the rationality and utility of the PP in Part II, this
article addresses two important contexts in which it is rational to apply the PP. Part III
2
For a thoughtful overview and treatment of the PP, see Douglass A. Kysar, “It Might Have Been: Risk,
Precaution and Opportunity Costs” (2006) 22 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 1. For a discussion of the definitional
issues surrounding the PP, see David A. Dana, “A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary
Principle” (2003) 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1315. .
3
For a good comparative discussion of the PP and CBA, see generally Gregory N. Mandel & James Thuo
Gathii, “Cost-Benefit Analysis Versus the Precautionary Principle: Beyond Cass R. Sustein’s Law of Fear”
(2006) 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1037.
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examines climate change, especially as it would affect developed northern hemisphere
countries, and Part IV discusses emerging nanotechnology, as it is used in a wide array of
consumer products. These contexts are very different, and so too is the contextual
justification for the PP.

In the context of climate change, the heuristic bias in favour of avoiding certain
losses may lead to an under-weighing of catastrophic scenarios of climate change, at least
in the context of U.S. policymaking. Part III of this article explores how prospect theory
(also called loss aversion), ambiguity aversion, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and the PPT
may interact in this context. Part IV discusses the case of emerging technologies, in
which the products are developed and marketed by for-profit entities that have strong
monetary incentives to explore and document the benefits of the products and much
weaker incentives to explore and document any possible adverse environmental or health
effects associated with the products. In the CBA framework, regulators tend to weigh
known benefits against known costs or at least known risks. So framed, this weighing
may pay too little attention to unknown costs and unknown risks that have intentionally
not been explored by market actors.

In both the cases of climate change and emerging technologies, application of the
PP can correct what would otherwise be a tendency to under-weigh the costs of not
taking action to prevent or mitigate possible environmental and health risks. The PP can
justify directing less attention to “bottom line” quantitative estimates of the costs of
unmitigated climate change and more attention to avoiding terrible but highly uncertain
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climate change scenarios.4 With nanotechnology, the PP can function as a means of
focusing less attention on whether or not nanotechnology is harmful or safe given current
knowledge and more attention to developing ways to produce more and better knowledge
about the risks posed by nanotechnology. The debate over the PP versus CBA has often
been too abstract and lacking in context. A more productive approach would be to instead
ask when  in what contexts — does it make sense to apply the PP and when does it
not? This article is an initial contribution to that re-framed debate.

II. Is the Precautionary Principle Incoherent in General and Hence Irrational?

A range of prominent academics have argued that the precautionary principle is
incoherent and in that sense irrational. Perhaps most notably, Cass Sunstein has
developed the PP-is-incoherent thesis in an important book and a number of articles.
Admittedly, Sunstein focuses his critique on what he calls strong forms of the PP. His
discussion leaves the overall impression that the PP is unhelpful at best and perverse at
worst. According to Sunstein:

The real problem with the Precautionary Principle, thus understood, is that it
offers no guidance — not that it is wrong, but that it forbids all courses of action,
including regulation.…Taken seriously, it is paralyzing, banning the very steps
4

See Martin L. Weitzman, “The Role of Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change”
Working Paper 07-11, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, online: (May 2007) Social
Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=992873>. Weitzman develops a highly sophisticated
argument for avoiding worst-case scenarios involving climate change, using the vocabulary and
mathematical constructs of economics. However, the dominant approach among economists and especially
economists using a CBA framework is still not to focus heavily on such scenarios. Moreover, invocation of
the PP can be helpful at directing policymakers and the general public attention to work such as
Weizmann’s that seeks to move beyond the confines of the traditional CBA approach.
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that it simultaneously requires. In some cases, it should be easy to see that in its
own way, stringent regulation would actually run afoul of the Precautionary
Principle… The claim is only that if the Precautionary Principle is taken literally,
it is offended by regulation as well as by nonregulation.. . [the Precautionary
Principle] stands as an obstacle to regulation and nonregulation, and to everything
in between.5

Sunstein rejects the framing of the debate over PP as one in which only money is
weighed against irreversible costs in human or non-human life. He does this by arguing
that human life can be at stake on both sides of the equation and that even the very
expenditure of money on regulatory purposes can cause irreversible losses to human (or
non-human) health because that money could have been spent otherwise to boost the
economy and hence welfare.6

Defenders of the PP emphasize that a precautionary approach can be taken with
respect to the risk of both regulatory action and inaction. For example, Per Sandin and his
colleagues contend that it is only by framing the PP too narrowly that it appears
incoherent, and that similar narrow framing could make any decision rule appear
incoherent. In their view, when the PP is applied in a reasonable and reflected manner,
then it is "applied also to the precautionary measures prescribed by the precautionary

5

Cass R. Sunstein, “Irreversible and Catastrophic” (2006) 91 Cornell L. Rev. 841 at 850, 852. See also
Cass R. Sunstein, “The Paralyzing Principle” (Winter 2002-2003) 26 Regulation 32 at 37: “We have seen
that both regulation an nonregulation seem to be forbidden in cases involving nuclear power, arsenic,
global warming, and genetic modification of food. The Precautionary Principle seems to offer guidance
only because people blind themselves to certain aspects of a risk situation, focusing on a mere subset of the
hazards that are at stake.” For other similar critiques of the PP, see: Aaron B. Wildavsky, But Is It True? A
Citizen’s Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1995) at 428: “the rhetoric [of the PP] works in part because it assumes what actually should be proved,
namely, that the health effects of the actions in view will be superior to the alternative”; Gary Comstock,
“Are the Policy Implications of the Precautionary Principle Coherent?”, online: Life Sciences Network
<http://www.lifesciencesnetwork.com/repositorydefining_pp.pdf>; and Daniel Bodansky, “Scientific
Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle” (September 1991) 33:7 Environment 4.
6
See Sunstein, “Irreversible,” ibid. at 846-47.
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principle itself."7 Similarly, Marko Ahteensuu defends the PP, arguing that "[i]f a
precautionary response to a threat imposed another risk (or an actual loss with the
probability of which [sic] being one) that is regarded as unacceptable, both risks should
be considered symmetrically."8

Sandin and Ahteensuu contend that a balanced precautionary approach to both the
risks of regulatory action and inaction is more readily achievable by moving away from
the stronger forms of the PP that critics tends to emphasize. Thus, Ahteensu writes
pre-emptive measures prescribed by the PP may take the form of outright
bans, phase-outs and moratoria, but also that of pre-market testing, labelling
and requests for extra scientific information before proceeding. Still another
kind of a precautionary response would be the establishment and
implementation of new precautionary risk assessment methodologies.9
John Weckert and James Moor also seem to rely on the existence of a range of
appropriate precautionary responses that could be used to address a risk that is subjected
to the PP.10

One might try to reconcile the Sunstein approach and the Sandin/Ahtensuu
approach by arguing that they are compatible but simply talking past each other,with
Sunstein and like-minded critics focusing on the strong forms of the PP and Sandin and
like-minded defenders focusing on weak forms of the PP. While this is a plausible
7

See Per Sandin et al, “Five Charges Against the Precautionary Principle” (2002) 5:4 Journal of Risk
Research 287 at 296.
8
Marko Ahteensuu, “Defending the Precautionary Principle Against Three Criticisms” (2005) 11
TRAMES 366 at 378.
9
Ibid. at 378.
10
John Weckert & James Moor, “The Precautionary Principle in Nanotechnology” in Fritz Allhoff et al,
eds., Nanoethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Nanotechnology (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 2007) 133. Weckert and Moor also seem to partially rely, unconvincingly in my view, on a
philosophical distinction between a duty not to do harm and a duty to do good, with the former being more
compelling than the latter, as a justification of the PP in the nanotechnology context.
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argument, there is indeed a fundamental discontinuity between the Sunstein and
Sandin/Ahteensu approaches. I shall describe each approach in turn and then illuminate
this discontinuity.

The Sunstein approach is based on two analytically separable propositions. First,
the PP treats the known costs and possible costs of regulating to prevent or mitigate an
environmental or health risk discontinuously with the possible costs of the environmental
or health risk itself, with the PP under-emphasizing the first and over-emphasizing the
second. Second, this discontinuity or inequality in treatment cannot be justified as a
logical matter. In contrast, the Sandin/Ahtensu approach denies the first proposition of
the Sustein approach: it contends that the PP, properly understood, treats the known costs
and possible costs of regulating to prevent or mitigate an environmental or health risk the
same as the known and possible costs of the environmental or health risk itself. Thus, in
this account, the PP does not need to have a rationale for treating the costs and possible
costs of regulatory action and regulatory inaction differently.

Sunstein has the better of the arguments for the simple reason that if there is no
discontinuity in the treatment of the costs and possible costs of regulatory action and
inaction, it is hard to see how the PP adds anything to regulatory analysis and debate. We
could rely on standard CBA and be in the same place. For the PP to add something
beyond CBA, the PP has in fact been invoked in specific controversies. It must be
conceded that the PP does call for differential treatment of the known costs and possible
costs of regulatory action and inaction in the face of an environmental or health risk. The
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weakness in the Sunstein approach does not arise from the first proposition but rather
from the second. It sometimes may be justifiable to give less weight to the known costs
and possible costs of taking action to mitigate or prevent an environmental or health risk
and give more weight to the known costs and possible costs of the risk itself; sometimes,
it may be justified not to engage in an analysis that is neutral toward both regulatory
action and inaction. The question is: when is it justified?

III. Climate Change: The PP as a Corrective to the Heuristic Bias In Favour of
Overweighing "Certain" Costs

A.

Why Catastrophic Costs Are Under-weighed

There is a debate about what role, if any, the PP should play in an analysis of
climate change policy, particularly in U.S. Because of the great scope of potential
climate change regulation, the stakes are very high with regard to whether or not climate
change is a context in which application of the PP is rational; almost every domain of the
economy has an impact on green house gas emissions and hence could be affected by
climate change regulation. The U.S. climate change regulation debate in the U.S. is one
where the PP could counteract "irrationality". To see why, we need to explore the
behavioural psychology applicable to the framing of this debate.

Table 1 sets out a number of the ways in which choices between regulatory action
and inaction can be framed that may affect how people perceive and make them. Critics
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of the PP such as Sunstein often focus on regulatory choices that they frame as choices
between the avoidance of possible losses that could result from either regulatory action or
regulatory inaction. For example, Sunstein discusses the choice between the loss of life
that could result from withholding a new drug from the market and the possible loss of
life that could result from allowing it on the market without adequate testing. Choices
between two quantified, low-probability losses, for example a five percent likelihood that
1,000 lives will be lost if the drug is kept off the market versus a one percent likelihood
that100,000 lives will be lost from drug complications if the testing is inadequate, are
choices that do not necessarily implicate any of the heuristic biases explored in the
behavioural literature.

TABLE 1: Biases and Skews Resulting from Framing Regulatory Decisions in Terms of
Quantifiable Loss
Framing of the

Framing of the

Psychological

Skewing from

Effect of

Effect of Regulatory

Bias Implicated

Rational Choice

Regulatory Action

Inaction

Certain Loss

Possible Loss

Loss Aversion/

Overweighing of

But Possibility

Prospect Theory

Certain Loss, Hence

Certain Loss

Quantified, and

Skew against

Hence No Ambiguity

Regulation

Possible Loss

Ambiguity

Unclear Whether

But Possibility Not

Aversion

Skews for or against

Quantified, and

Regulation
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Hence Ambiguity

The dominant frame, however, for many debates over regulation is between the
avoidance of assured or certain (not just possible) losses of that regulation, and the
avoidance of possible (not assured or certain) losses which tht regulation might prevent.
This framing implicates the behavioural economics and psychology literature which
strongly suggests that people generally do not perceive all losses and benefits according
to the axioms of rational choice theory. A central finding of the empirically-based
"prospect theory" is that people are risk-seeking with respect to the avoidance of what
they perceive to be losses; they will forego a larger expected benefit to avoid the risk of
incurring a loss, even if the expected loss (measured by probability of loss multiplied by
magnitude of loss) is less than the expected benefit. A second, somewhat less-discussed
proposition of prospect theory is that people are risk-seeking in the avoidance of certain
losses. They will take the risk of a possible loss rather than accept a certain loss, even if
the expected value of the possible loss (again, measured by probability of loss multiplied
by magnitude of loss) is greater than the magnitude of the certain loss. From the
perspective of this theory, it matters very much in human decision-making what is framed
as a gain as opposed to a loss, and among losses, what is framed as a certain loss as
opposed to a possible loss.

Prospect theory was derived largely from the results of lab experiments, but it has
been invoked to explain real-world observations. For example, people have relatively low
levels of voluntary disability insurance, and it may be that, from a rational choice
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perspective, people under-insure against disabling accidents because they frame the
payment of the insurance premium as a certain loss and the costs associated with an
accident as an uncertain loss.

To the extent that people are risk-seeking in the avoidance of certain losses,
regulatory decision-making and regulatory outcomes can be substantially affected.
Experts in regulatory agencies are, like anyone else, probably vulnerable to heuristic
biases as much as the subjects of the experiments conducted by behavioural economists
and psychologists.11 Nonetheless, regulators do not make decisions in a vacuum; their
decisions are informed, shaped and sometimes dictated by the political process, and
hence by the biases of politicians, who in turn respond to their constituents’ sentiments
and perceptions that reflect widely-shared characteristic of human psychology.12

If prospect theory is correct, when people are confronted with choices, of this
kind, they will tend to "irrationally" overweigh the avoidance of the certain loss and
"irrationally" under-weigh the avoidance of the possible loss. This does not mean that
people will never accept certain costs — for example immediate cash outlays — to avoid
possible losses. But it does mean that, at the margins, people will sometimes refuse to
bear certain costs or bear as great certain costs as "rationally" might be justified by the
magnitude of the possible loss at issue.
11

On the difficult question of whether and if so when and how “experts” are subject to fewer different
biases than law people, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, “Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design” (2001-2002) 87 Cornell L. Rev. at 549. See also David A. Dana, “Setting
Environmental Priorities,” (1994) 74 B.U.L. Rev. 365, questioning a model of reliance on bureaucratic
experts to achieve regulatory rationalization.
12
See Jonathan Nash, “Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice” (2005-2006) 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 313,
discussing the relevance of behavioural economics for regulatory debates and the role of framing on the
choice of regulatory instruments.
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In the U.S. context, climate change or global warming has largely been framed as
a matter of possible large losses — that is, not certain or assured losses — that may occur
if regulation is not adopted to slow current rates of warming. This framing is different
than in other parts of the world, where the losses from unmitigated climate change are
more likely to be perceived as certain. The difference between the framing in the United
States and the framing elsewhere reflects the differences in vulnerability of different parts
of the world under gradual warming scenarios.

With respect to the costs of not taking regulatory action to prevent or mitigate
climate change, much of the debate has centred on the rate of climate change. Scenarios
in which the climate slowly warms involve direct costs (in human life, well-being and
economic activity), but those costs, most analyses suggest, would be concentrated on
countries that currently have large coastal exposure, warm climates or relatively low
wealth and hence low adaptive capacity.13 Relatively speaking, the U.S. fares well under
slow warming scenarios compared to Japan or Europe, because of its very large noncoastal areas. Indeed, some analyses suggest that certain sectors in the U.S., such as
agriculture, will actually benefit from gradual warming.14 Therefore, to the extent that

13

See generally Margin Parry et al, eds., Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); see also William D. Nordhaus & Joseph Boyer, Warming
the World: Economic Models of Global Warming (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000), discussing
regional impacts of climate change.
14
See e.g., Oliver Deschenes & Michael Greenstone, “The Economic Impacts of Climate Change:
Evidence from Agricultural Profits and Random Fluctuations in Weather” (2004) Research Paper No. 0426, MIT Department of Economics, online: Social Science Research Network
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=564722>; Jason S. Johnston, “Climate Change Hysteria and the Supreme Court:
The Economic Impact of Global Warming on the U.S. and the Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Under the Clear Air Act” (2008) Research Paper No. 08-04, University of Pennsylvania,
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only gradual warming seems inevitable absent new regulation, climate change is not
framed in the U.S. as involving certain losses from regulatory inaction.

Of course, there are rapid warming scenarios that are associated with substantial,
indeed catastrophic, costs throughout the world (including the U.S.). Most
commentators, however, still believe that rapid warming is relatively unlikely (although
how unlikely is very contestable). People are thus less concerned with the costs
associated with a rapid warming/catastrophic scenario — including the large losses that
could result both inside and outside the U.S. — because such losses are framed as
possible or uncertain rather than likely.

Both in the U.S. and elsewhere, there has been a recognition that compliance with
aggressive carbon dioxide reduction targets will translate into real and certain costs in
terms of higher energy bills, among other things. The debate has largely centred on how
much electric bills and other expenses will increase, not whether they will increase.15 To
simplify, in the dominant framing In the U.S., the choice about climate change is
predominantly framed as being between something like a twenty percent increase in one's
electricity bill or a small probability of flooding and tropical disease in a coastal state like

Institute for Law and Econic Research, online: Social Science Research Network
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1098476>.
15
Compare Dave Michaels, “EPA: Greenhouse gas limits would lead to ‘modest’ electricity price increases”
(22 April 2009), online: The Dallas Morning News
<http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/04309dnbusgreenhouse.fd9dc04c.html>, with
Elizabeth Souder, “ERCOT: Texans could see big electric bill hikes under proposed carbon limits” (13
May 2009), online: The Dallas Morning News
<http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/texassouthwest/stories/051309dnbusgreenhousegasli
mits.1bbef9f7.html>.
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Maryland or North Carolina. In other words, it is a choice between accepting certain costs
or avoiding merely possible costs.16

Because, as framed in the U.S. context at least, climate change regulation
juxtaposes certain costs against possible (if larger) costs, it may well be a domain in
which regulators, politicians and constituents will irrationally overweigh the costs of
regulating and irrationally underweigh the costs of regulatory inaction. The fact that the
need to address climate change is shown by opinion polls to be a low priority among
Americans — notwithstanding the recent activity in Congress — may reflect the way the
issue has been framed.17 Some polling suggests that Americans do not want to pay out of
pocket — to bear certain losses — merely to avoid possible loss from climate change.18
The political backlash against the proposal for a gas tax increase during the Clinton
Administration, and the decision of the Obama Administration not to openly embrace the
gas tax at all, also suggests the degree to which avoidance of what will be readily
perceived as certain costs can be overweighed and hence skew policy and legal
outcomes.19

16

There is admittedly some substantial question whether the apparent certain costs are so certain after all, at
least in terms of their magnitude. There may be offsetting economic benefits of climate change regulation,
inflation of direct costs by interest opposed to regulation. By the same token, the direct, certain costs of
climate change regulation may produce some other significant cost in terms of job loss and other economic
dislocation and loss of GDP. These caveats aside, however, it is hard to frame meaningful climate
regulation as not imposing significant, and certain, losses.
17
Brandford Plumer, “Public Yawns at Climate Change. But Why?” The New Republic (22 January 2009),
online: The New Republic
http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/environmentandenergy/archive/2009/01/22/public-yawns-at-climatechange.aspx (discussing Pew Center poll).
18
Cass R. Sunstein, “The Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change” (2007) 107
Colum. L. Rev. 503.
19
Indeed, opponents of cap-and-trade legislation are emphasizing the way it may operate in practice as a
gas tax. See e.g., Nick Loris, “Doomed to Repeat Energy Tax History?” The Foundry (18 May 2009),
online: The Foundry <http://blog.heritage.org/2009/05/18/doomed-to-repeat-energy-tax-history-part-8-in-a10-part-series/>.
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Finally, in addition to the aversion to bearing losses that are certain, there may be
other psychological phenomena that tend to lead to less than "rational" support for
climate change regulations around the world. Most notable of these phenomena is
temporal myopia, the tendency of people to discount the future (and future effects) at an
extremely high rate, perhaps because of the effects of bounded rationality. As Kip
Viscusi explains,

temporal myopia . . . mean[s] that people will generally use a rate of interest
that is consistently too high when discounting future effects. . . . People place
too low a weight on future environmental consequences. Thus, even if they
personally value environmental quality, long-term effects will not be
recognized to a sufficient extent if people place an irrationally low weight on
future effects. Overcoming this irrationality remains a main policy
challenge.20

Such myopia is a particularly big problem in the climate change context because
the costs (certain or possible) of addressing climate change are immediate or near-term,
but the effects of unmitigated climate change are substantially in the future, with the most
dramatic effects (under both gradual and catastrophic scenarios) many years away. As
Sunstein notes that Americans seem to understand "the most serious risks are long term"
and "[i]t is also clear that this point affects people's willingness to support expensive
precautions."21 The myopia bias is similar to two other psychological phenomena that
Richard Posner argues may result in too little attention to catastrophic possibilities: an
inherent limit on human attention, resulting in a focus on immediate concerns and a

20

W. Kip Viscussi, “Using Economics to Fuel Responsible Energy Consumption Decisions” (2008) 28
Environmental Law Report 1084 at 10843-10844.
21
Sunstein, “Divergent American Reactions,” supra note 19.
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temperamental tendency toward optimism about the future, even in the absence of any
specific actions to address future problems.22

B. What Difference the PP Can Make

Critics of the PP have argued that it is indeterminate and hence basically useless
because it can never reveal how much precaution is due in a given case. But many
principles and practices are indeterminate in their precise results and policy
implications.23 As long as invocation of the PP will draw more attention to huge costs
associated with highly uncertain but terrible scenarios, and as long as we believe that
heuristic biases will otherwise cause too little attention to be paid to those scenarios,
invocation of the PP in the climate change context helpful in producing a more balanced
discourse — whatever the ultimate policy choices.

Invocation of the PP, by itself, may be enough to balance the policy discourse on
climate change, even if policymakers continue to use traditional quantified CBA, and just
include a numerical probability for catastrophic climate change in the absence of
regulatory action and a numerical estimate of the expected costs of such catastrophic

22

Richard Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 119120.
23
See Dana, “Behavioral Economic Defense,” supra note 2, at 1317-1318: “The precautionary principle is
indeterminate, but that does not make it meaningless. Principles can express and reinforce value
commitments and procedurally structure decisionmaking without dictating a single set of specific,
substantive outcomes; principles may help put certain extreme options off the table, provide a boost to the
advocacy of some in the political community, and force others in that community to marshal more evidence
on behalf of their positions. If indeterminacy rendered a principle meaningless, then most of the core
principles in our legal and political tradition, such as democracy, due process, and the rule of law, also
would be meaningless.”
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change. The PP can serve as a means of framing the quantitative CBAs as only a partial
and potentially misleading picture of the danger of choosing regulatory inaction.

A more aggressive but nonetheless justifiable deployment of the PP would be to
use it as part of the rationale for not quantifying the probability and expected costs of
catastrophic scenarios. This refusal to quantify could be scientifically justified given how
little we know about the real probability distribution of catastrophic scenarios.24 It would
also counteract the tendency to overweigh the certain costs of prevention and mitigation,
and to excessively discount or ignore the future costs from regulatory inaction.

Why would leaving open-ended (and hence ambiguous) the probability of
catastrophic climate change scenarios be likely to result in a relatively heavier weighing
of the uncertain costs than would probably occur if some sort of numerical probability
distribution were assigned to catastrophic scenarios? From a pure rational choice
perspective, perhaps it should not occur. The psychological literature nevertheless
suggests that while people are risk-seeking in the avoidance of certain losses as against
the avoidance of possible losses when there is numerical probability or probability
distribution for the possible losses, people are risk-seeking in the avoidance of truly
ambiguous possible losses —that is, losses that are so uncertain that no numerical
estimate of the probability or probability distribution of their occurrence is available.
Although there is disagreement regarding the definition of "ambiguity" and "ambiguity
aversion," the basic idea is that ambiguity is "an intermediate state between ignorance
24

For a discussion of various approaches to the uncertainties about the uncertainty of catastrophic warming,
see Daniel H. Cole, “The Stern Review and Its Critics: Implications for the Theory and Practice of BenefitCost Analysis” (Winter 2008) 48 Nat. Resources J. 53.
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(i.e., complete lack of knowledge) and risk (in which a probability distribution is
specified)",25 and that people are more averse to an ambiguous bet than to a quantified
risk of loss. The depth and robustness of the phenomenon of ambiguity aversion is, to be
sure, a matter of debate,26 as is the robustness of the tendency for risk-seeking in the
avoidance of certain losses. But if people are "irrationally" risk-seeking in avoiding both
certain losses and ambiguous losses, then a decision framed as a choice between the
avoidance of a certain loss on the one hand and the avoidance of an ambiguous loss on
the other may be one where irrational biases cancel out where there is no departure from
what rational choice theory would dictate.27 In other words, where the choices between
the certain losses entailed in prevention and mitigation efforts and the ambiguous losses
associated with catastrophic scenarios, heuristic biases may, on net, not distort the
decision-making.

IV. Nanotechnology Products: The PP as a Corrective to the Market Incentives Not
to Investigate Possible Adverse Environmental and Health Risks

A.

Abundant Benefits Research and Scarce or ‘No Adverse Effects’ Research

25

Gideon Keren & Léonie E.M. Gerritsen, “On the Robustness and Possible Accounts of Ambiguity
Aversion” (1999) 103 Acta Psychologia 149 at 150. See also Larry G. Epstein, “A Definition of
Uncertainty Aversion” (1999) 66 Review of Economic Studies 579 at 579-583.
26
There is a large literature exploring possible limiting conditions for ambiguity aversion. See e.g. Craig
R. Fox & Amos Tversky, “Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance” (1995) 110 The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 585.
27
It is also true, of course, that the aversion to certain losses may be stronger than the aversion to
ambiguity, or vice versa: how these biases operate may well be context-dependent, and in any case there
appears to be no experimental literature attempting to assess the interactions between aversion to certain
losses and aversion to ambiguous losses. This is an issue that warrants further exploration.
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The PP has often been invoked with respect to new products on the market that
incorporate innovative technology such as genetically modified organisms. The PP may
make sense in this context; developers of new products, unless required to do so, have
good reasons not to explore, disclose and act upon findings that their products have
adverse effects, and instead to focus narrowly on producing of information on the
beneficial aspects of those products.

It is not always the case, in the absence of PP-inspired regulation, that developers
and marketers of products with new technology will avoid exploring the theoretically
plausible risks posed by their products. Sometimes we would expect that concerns about
liability or reputation will encourage adequate pre-market and post-market testing and
surveillance. But when certain conditions regarding the products are met, we might
expect that rational, profit-maximizing corporations and other actors will not invest in
testing and monitoring. These conditions include the following: when particular products
pose theoretical risks but not empirically-established ones; when any adverse effects
would likely occur only in the relatively distant future; and when the link between the
product and any distant adverse effects could well escape notice, or at least be difficult to
establish as a matter of "but for" causation. In such cases, by providing an economic
rationale for testing and surveillance requirements, the PP may correct the imbalance
between the investment in exploring the products' benefits and the investment in
exploring its possible adverse effects.
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The analysis in this part of the article may apply in a number of contexts, but
focuses only on one: nanotechnology and products containing nanotechnology.
Generally, nanotechnology is defined as technology that incorporates manufactured
nanomaterials, which are engineered, extremely small materials, as small as 1/80,000 the
width of a human hair.28 Nanomaterials in current use employ common, normally
harmless elements such as gold, silver, titanium, and carbon, but nanoscale materials can
function very differently than larger materials made up of these same elements. Because
of their distinctive size-related functional attributes, nanomaterials may be very useful in
arenas ranging from cancer treatment to wrinkle prevention. The size-related attributes of
these materials, however, may translate into significant health risks. They may be able to
pass various protective barriers in the human body and ultimately lodge in organs, such
as the brain or lungs, where they could do damage.29 Because extremely small particles
can have surface areas that are relatively large for their mass, they may have effects that
conventional toxicology — which has long focused on predicting effects based on mass
or weight of the possible toxin — does not predict.30

28

Precise definitions of nanotechnology vary but all seem to include the idea of extreme small size –
including one or more dimensions less than 100 nanometers – and the fact that the atomic or molecular
material was, and is, not simply found in its purely natural state, but has been the subject of some imaging,
measuring, modeling, and/or manipulation at the atomic or molecular scale. See J. Clarence Davies,
“Managing the Effects of Nanotechnology,” (2006) Pen 2 Woodrow Wilson Center Project on Emerging
Technologies at 7; Royal Society “Nanoscience” supra note 7 at 5.
29
See e.g. Ben Harder, “Conduit to the Brain: Particles Enter the Nervous System Via The Nose” (2004)
165 Science News 54. As Richard Denison of Environmental Defense has testified, the "surprising results"
in early studies of nanoparticles include that "[t]hey can cross from the lung, when inhaled, directly into our
blood" and these results mean we should not "ignore these behaviors" and should look further. Denison
also stresses that the research to date "has only been short-term in nature" and we "have no chronic toxicity
testing . . . ." U.S., Environmental and Safety Impacts of Nanotechnology: What Research is Needed?
Hearing Before the Committee on Science of the House of Representatives, 106th Cong. (Washington,
D.C., 17 November 2005), online: < http://www.house.gov/science> at 121-122.
30
On the general topic of possible risks posed by nanotechnology, see Jo Anne Shatkin, Nanotechnology:
Health and Environmental Risks (Boca Raton FL: CRC Press, 2008); U.S., Environmental Protection
Agency, Nanotechnology White Paper (Washington D.C.: Science Policy Council, 2007), online:
<www.epa.gov/ncer/nano/publications/whitepaper12022005.pdf>; National Research Council, Review of
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Relatively little is understood about the health, safety and environmental risks
posed by the manufacture, use and disposal of products containing nanotechnology. As
Andrew Maynard has emphasized, a defining characteristic of nanoparticles is variability
and hence unpredictability.31 Nanoparticles of the same element can be formulated into
an array of different sizes with different coatings. Depending on how they are configured
and manufactured, nanoparticles of the same element may behave in very different ways
in the human body and in the environment. The lack of research on nanotechnology, and
hence the lack of understanding of the risks, is a theme of every major report on the
subject, and a point on which academic commentators, NGOs, scientific societies,
legislators, and major industry players agree (despite their disagreements on many
things)32

A number of prominent scientists have focused on the pressing need for
investment in the development of new tools and metrics for evaluating the safety of

the Federal Strategy for Nanotechnology-Relate Environmental, Health, and Safety Research (Washington,
D.C.: National Academies Press, 2009); Royal Society, “Nanoscience” supra note 7 at 5.
31
See U.S., United States House of Representatives Committee on Science & Technology Hearing on: The
National Nanotechnology Initiative Amendments Act of 2008 Testimony of Andrew D. Maynard, 110th
Cong. (Washington D.C., 16 April 2008) at 5.
32
See e.g. Lloyd's, “RISKS: Lloyd’s Emerging Risks Team Report: Nanotechnology Recent
Developments, Risks, and Opportunities” (2007) online: <
http://www.lloyds.com/NR/rdonlyres/B9C7371E-83D4-49DD-82685D6C800FBDDF/0/ER_Nanotechnology_Report.pdf.> at 3 (explaining that "[i]t is unclear whether
nanoparticles can cause chronic health impacts" and "[t]here is still too little research into the potential
negative impacts of this technology on the environment"), and Samuel N. Luoma, Silver Nanotechnologies
and the Environment: Old Problems or New Challenges? (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center,
Project on Emerging Technologies (PEN) 15, 2008) at 12. ("All […] analyses cite the almost complete lack
of scientifically based knowledge about risks from materials with the unique physical properties that
accompany particles this small . . . ").
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nanomaterials. For example, a group of nanotechnologists writing in Nature in 2006 set
forth a multi-decade agenda outlining what methods must be developed for the possible
commercialization of nanotechnology. According to that agenda, key research goals
should be to:

*Develop and validate methods to evaluate the toxicity of engineered
nanomaterials, within the next 5–15 years.
*Develop models for predicting the potential impact of engineered
nanomaterials on the environment and human health, within the next 10
years.
* Develop robust systems for evaluating the health and environmental
impact of engineered nanomaterials over their entire life, within the next 5
years.33

33

See Andrew D. Maynard et al., “Safe Handling of Nanotechnology” (2006) 444 Nature 267; See also
National Research Council, Federal Strategy for Nanotechnology, supra note 32 at 11 (concluding that “[a]
robust national strategic plan is needed for nanotechnology-related environmental, health, and safety
research that . . . . should focus on research to support risk assessment and management, should include
value-of-information considerations, and should identify . . . Specific research needs for the future in such
topics as potential exposures to engineered nanomaterials, toxicity, toxicokinetics, environmental fate, and
standardization of testing.”); Richard Denison, A Proposal to increase Federal Funding of Nanotechnology
Risk Research By $100 Million (2005) [unpublished, archived at Environmental Defense] at 4 (“[e]ven
before the research that will allow hazards and exposures to be quantified, a number of more fundamental
needs must be addressed. . . . [W]e currently lack a good understanding of which specific properties will
determine or are otherwise relevant to nanomaterials’ risk potential. . . . [M]any of the methods, protocols
and tools needed to characterize nanomaterials, or to detect and measure their presence in a variety of
settings (e.g., workplace environment, human body, environmental media) are still in a very early stage of
development.”); Statement of Matthew M. Nordan, President of Lux Research Inc., in a Testimony before
the House Committee on Science. U.S., Nanotech Commercialization Has Advanced , but Government
Action to Address Risk Has Not: Testimony Before the House Committee on Science, 109th Cong.
(Washington D.C., 21 September 2006), online:
<http://science.house.gov/commdocs/hearings/full06/Sept%2021/nordan.pdf.> at 7 (explaining the need for
"…to develop frameworks that companies and researchers can put to use in evaluating their own materials"
and calling for investment in "…understanding the basic science of nanoparticle EHS factors…" to make
possible "…safe nanotech developments.").
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With respect to information about certain general categories of nanotechnology
(such as titanium oxides) and certain pathways for them into the human body (such as
through facial skin), there have been sporadic studies and some significant but still
relatively nascent research programs. The completed studies so far often have
inconsistent results, and hence simply underscore how much is not known.34 It is
impossible to say that any kind of nanotechnology is safe in all forms, not even carbon
nanotubes, which have attracted the most attention and study. Nor is it possible to say
that any kind of nanoparticle is generally unsafe, or unsafe in all, or even many forms.35
And while there is now some research that directly addresses the health risks of human
exposure, we are truly at square one in the study of the effects of nanoparticles in the
broader environment.36

Studies published to date focus on categories of nanoparticles such as carbon
nanotubes, rather than on particular products that are on the market or under
development. Because there is an incomplete public inventory of nano-components in
current products (not to mention products under development), we have no reliable
knowledge regarding the full range of categories of nanotechnology that used are or soon
will be used in commercial processes and products. Since the particular formulation of a

34

Ibid., noting inconsistent results regarding nanoparticle toxicity to date, as "[f]or instance, while Günter
Oberdörster at Rochester University found that smaller particles of titanium dioxide (TiO2) are more
harmful that [sic] large ones, David Warheit at DuPont found no relationship between size and toxicity; he
also found that nanoparticles of silica (SiO2) and zinc oxide (ZnO) are less harmful than larger ones."
35
This has been the basis for industry arguments against regulation at this time. For a critique of regulation,
see Gary Marchant et al., “Nanotechnology Regulation: The United States Approach” in Graeme Hodge et
al., New Global Frontiers in Regulation: The Age of Nanotechnology (Bodmin, Cornwall: Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited, 2007) 189 at 201-202.
36
Royal Society, “Nanoscience”, supra note 7 at 45 (surveying the dearth of studies on ecotoxicology of
nanoparticles).
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nanoparticle is thought to be key in determining its behaviour, even nanoparticles which
appear to be safe in basic scientific testing may pose risks in particular products.

Some companies such as DuPont clearly are testing nanotechnology products
under development,37 but in general, we really do not know how much testing has been
completed by private industries. There is almost no publicly available data on the
product-specific risks of nanotechnology products. It is also unclear how much
information has been voluntarily provided by industries to regulators in the U.S. or
elsewhere. Government regulators — and notably the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency — have called for companies to voluntarily provide them with the information
they possess regarding their products. But the relatively small amount of that material
which has been made public suggests a selective response to that call for voluntary
disclosure.

The apparent lack of data on the safety of nanotechnology products might not be
troubling if we could safely assume that manufacturers would not produce and market
unsafe products out of fear of future liability, even if they have not and will not make
their safety studies public. The argument that the threat of liability will encourage
voluntary testing, however, presupposes two things that are not always true in all contexts
and almost certainly not true in the context of nanotechnology products. First, it assumes
a robust standard for liability whereby alleged tortfeasors are held liable even if they had
no actual knowledge of a potential hazard or could only have gained such knowledge

37

See Environmental Defense-Du Pont Nano Partnership, “Nano Risk Framework” (2007), online:
<www.nanoriskframework.com>.
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with great difficulty, if at all. The American tort system, like the European and Japanese
systems, employs a standard of liability in which the absence of actual knowledge of a
risk can negate liability, given that a plaintiff must show that the defendant either knew or
reasonably should have known of the risk.38 Second, the argument assumes that the

38

One position that some courts and commentators have sometimes articulated is that a manufacturer is or
should be liable for harms that at trial can be shown to have been caused by the product even if the
manufacturer did not know or could not have reasonably foreseen that the product would cause such harm
when the product was first manufactured and released to the market or when it was sold to the particular
plaintiff. This approach is sometimes described as hindsight liability or genuine strict liability, as it
effectively removes any defence based on the absence of or limit in scientific evidence regarding causation
prior to the time of trial, and the (increasingly few, over time) courts that have embraced this approach have
emphasized the power of strict liability to incentivize research into potential, but not well-understood, risks.
See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539 at 548 (N.J. 1982). See also Omri BenShahar, “Should Products Liability Be based on Hindsight?” (1998) 14 J. L. Econ. & Org. 325 (reviewing
the state of the law and then modeling corporate research incentives under hindsight liability).
At the other side of the spectrum from genuine strict liability is liability that requires a showing of actual
knowledge on the part of the manufacturer of the harmful effects of the product at the time the product was
sold to the particular plaintiff. Although actual knowledge has indeed been alleged in many of the bestknown mass products liability cases, it is not clear that any court has completely embraced an actual
knowledge requirement in products liability cases. The state tort statutes in some states establish a strong
form of the so-called “state of the art” defence; such statutes could be read to mean that scientific
information or evidence developed after a product is introduced into the market cannot be used against the
manufacturer in establishing liability. However, these statutes presumably were drafted with mechanical
devices in mind (e.g. lawnmowers that turn out to malfunction), and have not been construed to mean that a
manufacturer has absolutely no obligation to ignore developments in scientific evidence regarding drugs,
chemicals or similar products after the product first enters the market, even if the market was tested to the
highest industry standards prior to it being first introduced into the market.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability articulates what is probably the standard that most
courts in the United States now endorse. Under this reasonable forseeability or “should have known”
standard, manufacturers can be held liable if they should have known of the harm the product could create
when they sold it to the plaintiff without an appropriate warning. Restatement (Third) Sec. 2(c). Under
this standard, lack of actual knowledge is not a defence, but neither can the plaintiff simply hold the
manufacturers liable for risks and harms that the manufacturer could not have known when the products
were sold to the plaintiffs. With respect to product testing, the Restatement provides that "a seller bears
responsibility to perform reasonable testing reasonable testing prior to marketing a product and to discover
risk and risk avoidance measures that such testing would reveal. A seller is charged with knowledge of
what reasonable testing would reveal." Restatement (Third) Sec. 2 cmt. m. As Mark Geistfeld has
explained, because proving what a reasonable research program would reveal is an "…extraordinarily
demanding…" standard, the Restatement (Third) standard "…effectively immunizes…" the manufacturer
even from liability for many knowable risks. Mark A. Geistfeld, Principles of Product Liability (New
York: Foundation Press, 2006) at 152-53. The Restatement approach is very similar to that followed in
European and Japanese law. See Jane Stapleton, Product Liability (Toronto: Butterworths Canada Ltd.,
1994) at 50-51. The central legal development limiting liability in Europe was the EEC Directive on the
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning
liability for defective products (1985/374/EEC), online: EurLex < http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31985L03
74&model=guichett>. See also Stapleton, Products Liability at 49. The reasonable foreseeability/should
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harms which would form the basis of the tort claims would be apparent to the victims,
and that the connection between those harms and their alleged causes could be readily
proven. With respect to many kinds of products, the harms may not become apparent for
many years and the causal link may not even occur to many victims or may be very
difficult for them to prove.

If nanotechnology products do have harmful effects, they would likely be hard to
isolate and connect to the production, use or disposal of the products. With respect to skin
creams for example, consumers are very unlikely to know which creams contain
nanoparticles or to retain records of their use of cosmetics over time. Moreover, if
nanoparticles in skin creams can indeed permeate skin barriers, there may be any number
of adverse effects. Many of these effects could have a range of other causes, such as
genetics, or diet, or smoking,39 and may not surface until decades after the product was
last used. Asbestos-based liability, for example has dominated the American toxic tort
system in large part because asbestos exposure creates an easily identifiable, signature

have known standard is, of course, a kind of negligence standard. Indeed, citing the Restatement and
similar authorities, some commentators have concluded that American products liability torts, although still
sometimes labelled a strict liability domain, is squarely within the domain of negligence. See ibid. at 248
("Despite the 'strict liability' rhetoric . . . this has overwhelmingly remained the majority view: the liability
of manufacturers for design conditions . . . is . . . fault-based."); see also Gary Schwartz, “The Beginning
and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law” (1992) 26 Ga. L. Rev. 601 at 625-27.
And like all negligence standards, the reasonable forseeability/should have known standard used for
products is flexible and imprecise, and subject to much-more or much-less defendant-friendly
interpretations and applications. Everything depends on the conception of “reasonableness” one employs.
39
See Margaret A. Berger, “Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and
Toxic Torts” (1997) 97 Columb. L. Rev. Page number 2121-2122. (arguing that for toxic torts "…in most
instances, the adverse health effects for which plaintiffs seek compensation are also found in others who
have not been exposed to the substance or product in question. Because this ‘background’ rate exists, it is
impossible to tell whether any individual plaintiff's injury is attributable to the product . . . .").
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disease, mesothelioma,40 but there is no a priori reason to suppose that nanoparticles
would similarly result in signature diseases or conditions.

The defining attribute of nanoparticles — their incredibly small size — may mean
that it will be very hard to detect their presence in the environment.41 As a result, it is and
may continue to be extremely difficult to isolate nanoparticle pathways and to prove that
they caused human health effects or other harms that might be the basis for liability. The
closest analogy would be to endocrine-disrupting chemicals, which may have some toxic
effects but are pervasive in small quantities in the environment. Although much has been
made of the possibility of tort liability related to endocrine disrupters, that liability has
not in fact materialized, perhaps because of the difficulty of establishing particular
concentrations and particular pathways into the human body (or given the particularity of
private tort, into the plaintiff’s body).42 Environmental tort liability based on exposure to
nanoparticles might be even harder to establish, given their small size and elusive
nature.43
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See Troyen Brennan, “Environmental Torts” (1993) 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1 at 15.
See Gregory Mandel, “Nanotechnology Governance” (2008) 59 Ala. L. Rev. 1323 at 1345 (overviewing
the risks from nanotechnology and noting that "[e]exacerbating the challenge of nanotechnology risks is
that there currently is very limited capability to detect or measure nanoparticles . . . .").
42
For a review of the current state of the litigation and the American defence bar's positions, see Bruce J.
Berger & Michael L. Junk, “Endocrine Disrupters: The Potential Cloud of Manufacturer Toxic Tort
Liability” (2007) Def. Couns. J. 106 at 116-117.
43
Further, the corporate officials who will be deciding whether to engage in pre- or post-market testing and
monitoring for adverse effects must be assumed to have the same myopia bias that affects human beings
generally, and that bias is so much at play in the climate change context. Tort suits from nanotechnology
exposures, if they ever materialize and if they ever succeed and cost the product developer money, can be
expected to do so only many years after the key decision about whether to test and monitor are made.
Corporate executives may well discount heavily — myopically — the distant risk of tort liability. Indeed,
there are many reasons why corporate executives making decisions for a corporation might discount risk in
the future extremely heavily: after all, "[b]y the time liability is established or an expensive settlement is
reached, the present management will likely have moved on to other jobs or retired." See Berger,
“Eliminating General Causation,” supra note 41 at 2139.
41
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B. CBA Under Conditions of Asymmetrical Investment in the Exploration of
Benefits and Costs

The dearth of information that the market on possible adverse effects of
nanotechnology has important and troubling implications if regulatory decisions are to be
driven by conventional CBA analysis. Such analysis has started with what is known
about the costs, benefits and risks of both regulatory action and regulatory inaction. CBA
could attempt to factor in gaps in knowledge regarding risks, but it could not do so
effectively. At the end of the day, the basic CBA approach is to quantify and compare
expected costs and benefits.

To the extent that CBA uses the best available data to assess and compare risks, it
matters a great deal what investments have been made in the exploration of the risks
before conducting the CBA. If hundreds of nanotechnology products have been brought
to market and have generated great economic revenue, and if hundreds of patents have
been issued and business plans detailed and studies completed suggesting various
benefits from products under development, then any jurisdiction considering regulating
nanotechnology — and thus the CBA— will have to take seriously the risk that
regulatory burdens could lead to a loss in economic activity, jobs, investment, consumer
welfare and, as a result of the loss of possibly lifesaving new nanotechnology products,
human life.
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On the other side of the ledger, if there have been no direct studies of possible
adverse health or environmental effects of particular products or their components, and
no reports of actual harm to people or the environment, it may be "rational" to conclude
that the known benefits are not worth sacrificing in the name of an entirely theoretical
risk of adverse effects to human health or the environment. If, however, the CBA is
undertaken after ten or a hundred studies have been completed, it may be easier to
conclude that there is a substantial enough risk to warrant the burdens of regulation. The
pre-CBA investment in environmental, health and safety research can drive the CBA
itself and, to the extent regulatory decisions are based on CBA, that investment (or lack
thereof) can drive the decision whether to regulate or not.44

Furthermore, even the regulatory decision on whether to have publicly funded
studies or to require more studies by industry is affected by the level of previous
investments in research on environmental, health and safety effects. Additional studies
(what some have called precautionary science), has a direct expense: the resources could
be used elsewhere. If previous research shows that there is reason to investigate further, a
CBA can more readily justify the cost of additional research. If there is no data to give
credence to theoretical scenarios of adverse effects, it may be very hard to justify further

44

Cf. Anne Ingeborg Myhr & Roy Ambli Dalmo, “Nanotechnology and Risk: What Are The Issues?” in
Allhoff Fritz et al., eds. Nanoethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Nanotechnology, ed. by
(Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2007) at 154 ("Making decisions within the context of
scientific uncertainty complicates the traditional weighting of benefits against costs. Technological and
economical approaches, such as risk-cost-benefit analyses, may be used to specify the uncertainties within
a reduced scientific framework. However, such approaches cannot cope with complex biological and
ecological processes that, for instance, [nanotechnology] are going to be used in and released into. The
decision-makers might be prone to rely on short-term considerations of risk and thereby not include adverse
effects with a low probability or long-term hypothesis of risk in the decision").
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research whether funded by government or industry and even harder to justify a decision
to pull a product from the market.

C. What Difference Can the PP Can Make

Whereas the PP in the climate change context can change the prevailing discourse
by focusing more attention on catastrophic scenarios, in the nanotechnology context it
can help shift discourse from the narrow frame of reference of current knowledge on
current products to the broader frame of the need for more complete and balanced as part
of ongoing product development and marketing by private actors. In other words, the PP
can provide support for institutional change that will ultimately make CBA work more
effectively.

Government regulation in the U.S. and elsewhere has not required pre-market or
post-market testing and surveillance of products containing nanotechnology, nor has it
required the labelling of such products. This lack of regulation is arguably consistent with
the basic U.S. approach, with some notable exceptions such as the classification of new
drugs by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). That approach typically requires a
demonstration of a substantial risk of harm before regulatory burdens are imposed on
industry.45

45

See Wendy E. Wagner, “The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S.” (2000) 6:3
Human and Ecological Risk Assessment at 464 (characterizing U.S. chemical regulation as "…at best, a
schizophrenic regulatory program that acts on certain groups of new chemicals in a precautionary way, but
otherwise proceeds in a way that is essentially unprecautionary: regulator intervention is typically
correlated directly, rather than inversely, with the available scientific knowledge about product safety.")
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There are a range of possible precautionary requirements that could be applied to
nanotechnology products. Such products could be treated as new drugs and hence subject
to full-blown FDA review, or they could be subjected to less extensive requirements such
as toxicology screening at the laboratory level. Manufacturers could even be allowed to
market products before a safety study was completed, as long as they funded post-market
tests and surveillance. The under-investment in safety research also could be combatted
by voluntary programs that offer liability relief to manufacturers in return for testing and
surveillance commitments.46 All of these institutional reforms would be best advanced by
adherence to the PP because of its focus on what is not yet known about risks to human
health and the environment.47
In the European Union's Registration, Evaluation, and Authorisation of
Chemicals (REACH) Regulation,48 we have a recent example of how the PP can be used
to advance the case for a testing regime that counters the tendency of product developers
46

See David A. Dana, When Less Liability May Mean More Precaution: The Case of Nanotechnology
(2009) [unpublished, archived at University of California, Los Angeles], online:
<www.cnsi.ucla.edu/NanoRegulatoryPolicy/pdfs/dana.pdf>.
47
There have been a range of calls for regulation of nanotechnology, including regulation in the mode of
the strong version of the PP. For example, in 2007, a broad range of NGOs called for such a moratorium as
part of Principles for the Oversight of Nanotechnologies and Nanomaterials. That group endorsed a
precautionary principle regime which “…would include prohibiting the marketing of untested or unsafe
uses of nanomaterials and requiring product manufacturers and distributors to bear the burden of proof” or,
more pithily, “Simply put, ‘no health and safety data, no market.’” See NanoAction, Principles for the
Oversight of Nanotechnologies and Nanomaterials Declaration (2007), online:
<http://www.icta.org/nanoaction/page.cfm?id=223> at 4. One of the NGOs that endorsed the Principles –
Friends of the Earth – has been particularly vocal in pushing for a moratorium, particularly in the context of
cosmetics. See Friends of the Earth, Nanomaterials and Sunscreens and Cosmetics: Small Ingredients, Big
Risks (2006), online: <http://nano.foe.org.au>. Other highly–regarded organizations, such as the UK’s
Royal Society, have, while not endorsing the general moratorium approach, have argued for mandatory
regulatory reviews for safety of nanoparticles in products before their release into the marketplace. See
Royal Society, “Nanoscience,” supra note 7 at 84.
48
On REACH and nanotechnology, see Diana Bowman & Geert van Calster, “Reflecting on REACH:
Global Implications of the European Union's Chemicals Regulation” (2007) 4 Nanotechnology L. & Bus.
375 (discussing whether a mass condition for testing will exclude nanotechnology products). See also John
S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform
(2007) [unpublished, archived at SSRN < ssrn.com/abstract=1183942>] at 49-50 ("Having created a
demand for information, a regulatory system needs to supply it. As we have seen, REACH — with the
advantage of thirty additional years of experience with chemical regulation in Europe and the US — is
more urgently focused on information needs than TSCA was.").
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not to investigate and publicize possible adverse effects. REACH reverses the burden of
proof with regard to safety. It requires manufacturers to establish the safety of their own
chemical products, rather than requiring the government to prove the opposite in order to
to limit or prohibit the marketing of the products.Like all PP-inspired regulation, REACH
struggles with the questions of how much study will be required, given the cost and the
likely extent of gains in safety. The PP does not answer the "how much precaution
exactly" questions: for example, whether a clinical safety study should be required or
whether the human exposure risk is so minor that only post-market surveillance and the
disclosure of consumer complaints should be demanded. Nevertheless, by shifting the
terms of the debate, the PP helps to move us beyond the question of whether a product’s
known benefits and known risks warrant regulation, to a more far-reaching inquiry into
what information is needed to ground a reasonably informed decision on whether the
promised benefits justify the risks to human health or to the environment.

V. Conclusion

The Precautionary Principle (PP) may not cohere at a universal, de-contextualized
level, but it may cohere — or at least have a coherent rationale — in specific contexts.
The rationale for the PP in different contexts can be very different, as the cases of climate
change and nanotechnology illustrate. With respect to climate change, heuristic biases
may lead to an overweighing of the certain costs of preventing or mitigating climate
change, and an underweighing of the tremendous costs of catastrophic warming. With
respect to nanotechnology, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) can lead to an underweighing of
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possible risks because the profit motive will often lead market actors to verify a product’s
possible benefits but not to explore its possible adverse effects. Just as the rationale for
the PP may differ from one context to another, so may the policy implications of
invoking it. In the context of climate change, the PP can justify altering CBA to account
for catastrophic but highly improbable scenarios that would otherwise be disregarded In
the context of nanotechnology, the PP can justify a shift to a regime that requires or
encourages market actions to generate more safety data. In any context where the PP is
invoked, the goal is to correct an imbalance between our perception of the costs of
regulatory action and our understanding and consideration of the costs of regulatory
inaction.

33

